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DEVELOPING "TORT" STANDARDS
FOR THE AWARD OF MENTAL DISTRESS DAMAGES
IN STATUTORY DISCRIMINATION ACTIONS

Affronts to dignity are compensable by monetary damages for "mental
distress" 1 through various tort actions. 2 Some courts recently have recognized significant similarities between the emotional injury suffered by
victims of such "dignitary" 3 torts and the emotional injury suffered by
persons aggrieved under federal and state discrimination statutes. 4 Increasingly, victims of discrimination have sued successfully under these
statutes for mental distress damages. 5

1
"Mental distress" takes many forms and is referred to by many names. The injury
discussed in this article is primarily one that is not caused by physical injury. Mental distress
is therefore distinguished from "pain and suffering," which is typically compensated in
personal injury actions. See w. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 46-62, 330-35
(4th ed. 1971). The "mental distress" of discrimination will refer here principally to the
affront to dignity and the disruption of mental tranquility that accompanies the recognition
of one's inferior treatment by reason of membership in a statutorily suspect class. The most
distinctive components of the injury are often described as embarrassment, humiliation,
outrage, loss of dignity and disappointment.
2
See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 528 (1973), noting common law
cases where damages for the vindication of "dignitary interests" have been awarded for
assault, ·battery, malicious prosecution, invasion of privacy, and alienation of affections.
The most common "dignitary" actions, however, are defamation, see, e.g., Collins v. Retail
Credit Co., 410 F. Supp. 924 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Thomas v. E. J. Korvette, Inc., 329 F.
Supp. -1163 (E.D. Pa. 1971); and the intentional infliction of mental distress, Meyer v.
Nottger, 241 N. W.2d 911 (1976); Newby v. Alto Riviera Apts., 60 Cal. App. 3d 288, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 547 (1976).
3
The term "dignitary tort" is borrowed from C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TORTS 961 (2d ed. 1969), and Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 n. JO
(1974).
• In support of his conclusion that there is a right to trial by jury under the Civil Rights Act
of 1968, Title VIII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (1977), the federal fair housing law, Justice
Marshall favorably compared housing discrimination suits to tort actions, particularly those
of defamation and intentional infliction of mental distress. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189,
196 n. 10 (1974). In Rogers v.Exxon Research and Eng'r Co., 404 F. Supp. 324 (D.N.J.
1975), mental distress award vacated, 550 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 749
(1978), the court characterized the AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT, 29 U .s.c.
§§ 621-34 (1975), as a new "statutory tort."
5
Under federal statutes, victims of discrimination have experienced their greatest success
in the area of housing discrimination, both under Title VIII, Jeanty v. Mc Key & Poague,
Inc., 496 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1974); Steele v. Title Realty Co., 478 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1973);
Morehead v. Lewis, 432 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Stevens v. Dobs, Inc., 373 F. Supp.
618 (E.D.N.C. 1974); and in racial discrimination cases, under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1974) alone
or in conjunction with Title VIII; Gore v. Turner, 563 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1977); Crumble v.
Blumenthal, 549 F .2d 462 (7th Cir. 1977); Smith v. Anchor Building Corp., 536 F.2d 231 (8th
Cir. 1976); Parker v. Shonfeld, 409 F. Supp. 876 (N.D. Cal. 1975); McNeil v. P-N & S, Inc.,
372 F. Supp. 658 (N.D. Ga. 1974); Lamb v. Sallee, 417 F. Supp. 282 (E.D. Ky. 1976);
Hughes v. Dyer, 378 F. Supp. 1305 (W.D. Mo. 1974); Bishop v. Pecsok, 431 F. Supp. 34
(N.D. Ohio 1976); Clemons v. Runck, 402 F. Supp. 863 (S.D. Ohio 1975); Allen v. Gifford,
368 F. Supp. 317 (E.D. Va. 1973). See also Fort v. White, 530 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1976); Marr
v. Rife, 503 F.2d 735 (6th Cir. 1974). Section 1982 also provides a mental distress remedy for
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The relation between tort remedies and discrimination has been
racial discrimination in access to privately owned and operated recreational facilities,
Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Assoc. ,Inc., 410 U.S. 431 (1973), on remand, 367 F.
Supp. 860 (D. Md. 1973) (mental distress damages awarded). 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1974) has
served a similar function in the private school context, McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082 .
(4th Cir. 1975), affd, 427 U.S. 160, 166 n.4 (1976) (without discussion of mental distress
damages).
The availability of mental distress damages under federal employment discrimination
statutes is uncertain. Most courts have held that no mental distress remedy lies under
§ 2000e-5(g) of Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U .S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1974), which
authorizes courts to "order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may
include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees ... or any other equitable
relief as the court deems appropriate" (emphasis added). See Pearson v. Western Electric
Co., 542 F.2d 1150 (IOthCir. 1976); EEOC v. Detroit Edison, 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir.1975),
vacated on other grounds and remanded, 431 U.S. 951 (1977); Bradshaw v. Zoological
Soc'y of San Diego, 10 Fair Empt. Prac. Cas. 1268 (S.D. Cal. 1975); Alexander v. Consolidated Freightways, 421 F. Supp. 450 (D. Colo. 1976); Gillin v. Federal Paper Board Co., 12
Fair Empt. Prac. Cas. 1329 (D. Conn. 1975); Coilier v. Hunt-Wesson Foods, 13 Fair Empt.
Prac. Cas. 88 (S.D. Ga. 1976); Curran v. Portland Superintending School Comm., 435 F.
Supp. 1063 (D. Me. 1977); Yerrell v. Maryland Highway Admin., 13 Fair Empt. Prac. Cas.
1746 (D. Md. 1976); Whitney v. Greater 'N.Y. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 401 F.
Supp. 1363 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Wright v. St. John's Hospital, 414 F. Supp. 1202 (N.D. Okla.
1976); Presseisen v. Swarthmore College, 71 F.R.D. 34 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Jiron v. Sperry
Rand Corp., JO Fair Empt. Prac. Cas. 730 (D. Utah 1975); but see Humphrey v. Southwestern Portland Cement Co., 369 F. Supp. 832 (W.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 488
F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1974), and Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 5 Fair Empt. Prac. Cas. 393
(D.D.C. 1972), affd 503 F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ($500 "additional damages for harrassment" awarded for threats of violence directed toward a woman who had filed an EEOC
complaint). Most commentators have been critical of the courts' refusal to find mental
distress remedy under section 2000e-5(g). See Note, Damages for Federal Employment
Discrimination: Section 1981 and Qualified Executive Immunity, 85 YALE L. J. 518, 520
(1976); Note, Tort Remedies for Employment Discrimination Under Title Vil, 54 VA: L.
REv., 491, 498 (1968); Comment, Title V/1 and 42 U.S.C. § 198/: Two Independent Solutions, 10 U. RICH. L. REv. 339, 352-53 (1976); Comment, Employment Discrimination
Litigation: The Availability of-Damages, 44 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 497 (1976).
The Supreme Court has indicated in dictum that the remedial provision of Title VII is
independent from that of§ 1981, and that "[a] n individual who establishes a cause of action
under section 1981 is entitled to both equitable and legal relief, including compensatory and,
under certain circumstances, punitive damages." Johnson v. Railway Express Agency,
Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court's dictum is in direct
opposition to the positions of at least three federal courts: Reaves v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp., 430 F. Supp. 623 (E.D. Wisc. 1977); Howard v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 372 F. Supp.
854 (N.D. Ga. 1974); Tooles v. Kellog Co., 336 F. Supp. 14 (0. Neb. 1972), but is consonant
with the weight of critical opinion. Se.e, e.g .. Larson, The Development of Section /981 as a
Remedy for Racial Discrimination in Private Employment, 7 HARV. C.R. - C.L. L. REV. 56
(1972);Richards, Compensatory and Punitive Damages in Employment Discrimination
Cases, 27 ARK. L. REV. 603 (1973). In Marshall v. Electric Hose & Rubber Co., 413 F.
Supp. 663 (D. Del. 1976), a court relying on Johnson granted defendant's motion forajury
trial on plaintiff's claim for mental distress damages under section 1981 for racial discrimination in employment. Similarly, in Stith v. Manor Baking Co., 15 Fair Empt. Prac. Cas. 511
(W.D. Mo. 1976), a court, citing Johnson, denied defendant's motion to strike a claim for
compensatory damages under§ 1981. See also Balmes v. Board of Educ. of Cleveland City
School Dist., 436 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Ohio 1977) (motion to strike claim for compensatory
damages denied); Miller v. Doctor's Gen. Hosp., 76 F.R.D. 135 (W.D. Okla. 1977) (plaintiff
entitled to jury trial on compensatory damage claim).
Courts are sharply divided on the availability of mental distress damages under§ 626 (c) of
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1975), which
provides for civil actions for "such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate the purposes"
of the Act (emphasis added). The Third Circuit's opinion in Rogers v. Exxon Research and
Eng'r Co., 550 F.2d 834 (3rd Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3431 (1978), reversing the
cogent district. court opinion holding mental distress damages available under the ,'.\DEA,
404 F. Supp. 324 (U.N.J.1975), has been followed by a number of cou~s. Dean v. American

124

Journal of Law Reform

[VoL.11:122

examined extensively, 6 yet there has been little consideration of this
relationship with respect to appropriate evidentiary standards for the

Security Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L. W. 3518 (1978); Ellis
v. Phillippine Airlines, 17 Fair Empt. Prac. Cas. 67 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Hannon v. Continental
Nat'I Bank, 427 F. Supp. 215 (D. Colo. 1977); Postemski v. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft, 16
Fair Ernpl. Prac. Cas. 565 (D. Conn. 1977); Looney v. Commercial Union Assurance Cos.,
428 F. Supp. 533 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Fellows v. Medford Corp., 431 F. Supp. 199 (D. Ore.
1977); Cavanaugh v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 1124 (S.D. Tex. 1977); Jaeger v.
American Cyanamid Co., 16 Fair Empt. Prac. Cas. 569 (E.D. Wisc. 1978); see also Sant v.
Mack Trucks, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 621 (N.D. Cal:1976), but has been rejected in favor of the
logic of the district court opinion in Rogers by other courts, Bertrand v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 419 F. Supp. 1123 (N.D. Ill. 1976), affd (reconsidered in light of Third Circuit
opinion in Rogers), 432 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Coates v. National Cash Register Co.,
433 F. Supp. 655 (W.D. Va. 1977); see also Combes v. Griffin Television, Inc., 421 F. Supp.
841 (W.D. Okla. 1976); Walker v. Pettit Constr. Co., 437 F. Supp. 730 (D.S.C. 1977);
Buckholz v. Symons Mfg. Co., 16 Fair Empt. Prac. Cas. 1084 (E.D. Wisc. 1978).
State anti-discrimination statutes have provided awards of mental distress damages in a
number of cases. In the·housing context, mental distress have been awarded in at least three
states, Massachusetts Comm'n. Against Discrimination v. Franzaroli, 357 Mass. 112, 256
N.E.2d 311 (1970); Williams v. Joyce, 4 Ore. App. 482, 479 P.2d 513 (1971); State Human
Rights Comm'n v. Pauley, 212 S.E.2d 77 (W. Va. 1975), and have been awarded for
discrimination in public accommodations in a comparable number of states, Amos v. Prom,
Inc., 115 F. Supp. 127 (N.D. Iowa 1953); Batavia Lodge No. 196, Loyal Order of Moose v.
N.Y.S. Division of Human Rights, 35 N.Y.2d 143, 359 N.Y.S.2d 25, 316 N.E.2d 318 (1974);
Browning v. Slenderella Sys. of Seattle, 54 Wash. 2d 440, 341 P.2d 859 (1959).
State employment discrimination laws have been of most value to victims of discrimination because of the difficulties of obtaining mental distress damages under federal employment discrimination statutes, Loomis Electronic Protection, Inc. v. Schaefer, 549 P.2d 1341
(Alas. 1976); Boumewood Hosp. v. Massachusetts Comm'n. Against Discrimination, 358
N.E.2d 235 (1976); Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 151 N.J. Super. 15, 376 A.2d
535 (1977); Harvard v. Bushberg Bros., Inc., 137 N.J. Super. 537, 350 A.2d 65 (1975);
Broadway Realty, Inc. v. N.Y. State Division of Human Rights, 376 N.Y.S. 2d 17, 49 App.
Div. 2d 422 (1975); School Dist. No. I, Multnomah Co., Ore. v. Nilsen, 17 Ore. App. 601,
523 P.2d 1041 (1974), rev'd on other grounds, 271 Ore. 461, 534 P.2d 1135 (1975). See also
Branham v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 15 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cas. 111 (E.D. Mich. 1977); CAL.
Civ. CODE§ 52(a) (West Supp. 1978); HAW. REv. STAT.§ 515-13(b)(7) (1976); IDAHO CODE
§ 67-591 I (Supp. 1977); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-9-1-6(k)(I) (Bums Supp. 1977); KY. REV.
STAT. §§ 344.230(3)(h), 344.450 (1977); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 37.2605(2)(i), (2)(k),
37.2803 (Supp. 1977-78); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 213.127 (Vernon Supp. 1978); MoNT. REV.
CODES ANN.§ 64-309(1)(b) (Cum. Supp. I 1977); NEV. REV. STAT.§ 651.090 (1977); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN.§ 4112.051(E) (Baldwin 1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 962(c) (Purdon
Supp. 1977-78); R. I. GEN. LAWS § 34-37-S(L)(a) (1970); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 13-7-4(c) (1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495b (Supp. 1977), tit. 9, § 2461 (Supp. 1977);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 49.60.225 (Supp. 1976).
6
Much of the discussion concerning the implication of tort remedies into federal discrimination statutes has centered upon 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp. 1977), which provides in relevant
part that
in all cases where [the laws of the United States] are not adapted to the object, or
are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish
offenses against the law, the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the [forum] State ... so far as the same is not inconsistent
with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and
govern ... in the trial and disposition of the cause ....
In Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969), the Supreme Court interpreted § 1988 to mean "that both federal and state rules on damages may be utilized,
whichever better serves the policies expressed in the federal statutes." Id. at 240. Interestingly, few articles have considered § 1988 as a source of damage standards of liability;
rather, it has been looked to as a source of implied substantive damage remedies for statutes,
such as TITLE VII, which do not expressly provide full compensatory remedies. See, e.g ..
Note, Tort Remedies for Employment Discrimination Under Title VII, supra note 5 at
499-501. Similar arguments have been based on Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353
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award of mental distress damages in discrimination cases. 7 This article
will consider such standards. 8 After briefly tracing the history of mental
distress award standards in discrimination cases, this article will critically
examine present compensatory approaches in such cases and suggest an
alternative philosophy more consonant with tort compensation principles.

I.

PRESENT STANDARDS FOR THE AWARD OF MENTAL
DISTRESS DAMAGES IN DISCRIMINATION CASES

A. Early History

Many present notions regarding the compensation of the psychological
element of the discrimination injury derive from judicial conceptions of
mental distress developed prior to Brown v. Board of Education 9 and the
modem federal civil rights statutes. 10 In early cases under state discrimination laws, the courts often applied rigorous "intentional infliction of
mental distress'' 11 standards to the determination of emotional distress
liability. For example, in two early cases under state public accommodations statutes, 12 courts in Iowa and Washington looked to further evidence of the "outrageousness" of the defendants' actions to support a
mental distress award even though illegal discrimination had been proven.
In doing so, the courts focused upon whether the discrimination had been
effected by a recognizably "rude" act accomplished in the presence. of.
hearing of others. 13 The Supreme Court of Washington further required
evidence of "severe" emotional distress; "mere" feelings of embarrassment or disappoifltment were not sufficient. 14 The Washington court
expressly rejected plaintiff's suggestion that victims of unlawful discrimination could be presumed under Washington law to have suffered mental

U.S. 488 (1957), which held that courts should "fashion from the policy of our national labor
laws" the substantive law to be applied in suits under § 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act. Id. at 456. See Tort Remedies for Employment Discrimination under Title
Vil, supra note 5 at 501-03; Theis, Shaw v. Garrison: Some Obsen•ations on 42 U.S.C.
§ /988 and Federal Common Law, 36 LA. L. REV. 681 (1976).
1
A notable exception is an excellent article by Lichtman, The Cost of Housing Discrimination: Assessment of Damages and Attorney's Fees for Violations of the Civil Rights Act
of /866 and the Fair Housing Act of /968, 10 SUFFOLK L. REv. 963 (1976).
8
This article does not deal, however, with the availability of mental distress damages
generally or under particular statutes. See notes 5 and 6 supra. Rather, it will analyze the
standards applied by courts in cases under statutes already ir.terpreted to provide such
damages.
9
347 U.S. 483 (1954). See especially id. at 494, n. I I, often regarded as the genesis of
modem legal concern for the psychological effects of discrimination.
10
See. e.g., Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1974); Title
VIII, Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (1977).
II
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 46 and Comments d and k (1965); PROSSER,
supra note I, at 49-62.
12
Amos v. Prom, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 127 (N.D. Iowa 1953); Browning v. Slenderella
Systems of Seattle, 54 Wash. 2d 440, 341 P.2d 859 (1959).
13
See Amos, 115 F. Supp. at 133 ("public and illegal acts,"); Browning, 341 P.2d at
863-65.
14
See Browning, 341 P.2d at 865.
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distress worthy of substantial monetary compensation. 15 Perhaps because
of such rigorous evidentiary standards, mental distress awards under
early state discrimination laws were infrequent. 16
After Congress expressed a national policy against many types of
discrimination in 1964, 17 examination of the characteristics of the discrimination setting and the discriminator's conduct became less important
in evaluating mental distress claims. The fact of unequal treatment itself
was increasingly considered to be the primary source of emotional distress .18 This change in judicial focus better accommodates the peculiar
nature of discrimination injury, although the shift of emphasis has not
been unanimous. 19 The humiliation and loss to dignity felt by a victim of
discrimination is often unrelated to the "politeness" with which entitlements were denied or even to the inconvenience incurred in a later search
for alternative housing, employment, or accommodation. 20 Actionable
discrimination has recently been found in totally "polite" contexts,
where the victim confirms his suspicions of discriminatory motive or
systemic discriminatory effect long after the facially netural, yet discriminatory action was committed. 21 Moreover, in housing and public
accommodations contexts where the financial costs of finding alternative
services are often low and the restoration of denied opportunities is often
impractical, psychological injury may well be the only significant element
of compensatory damage in a discrimination action and may be the
element most important to the victim's sense of justice and legal vindica15
The Court suggested, however, that the character of such discrimination, its natural
consequences, and the difficulties of proving damages might support a presumption of
mental distress in the absence of contrary precedent. Id., at 865-66.
16
See cases cited in ANNOT., 40 A.L.R.3d 1290 (1970). But see Cook v. Patterson Drug
Co., 185 Va. 516, 39 S.E.2d 304 (1946) (white plaintiff recovered mental distress damages
because he was treated as if he were black); Alabama & V. Ry. Co. v. Morris, 103 Miss. 511,
60 So. 11 (1912) (mental distress damages for defendant's failure to observe segregation
laws, forcing plaintiff to associate with blacks; $15,000 jury verdict reduced to $2,000 on
appeal).
17
See Civil Rights Act of 1964.
18
Cf. 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2355, 2369-70 (1964): "The primary
purpose of [Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act] then, is to solve this problem, the
deprivation of personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal access to public
establishments. Discrimination is not simply dollars and cents, hamburgers and movies; it is
the humiliation, frustration and embarrassment that a person must surely feel when he is told
that he is unacceptable as a member of the public because of his race or color."
19
Application of "intentional infliction" standards now occurs almost exclusively in state
anti-discrimination cases, see, e.g., Yanta v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 66 Wis. 2d 53,
224 N.W.2d 389 (1974); Gray v. Serruto Builders, Inc., 110 N.J. Super. 297, 265 A.2d 404
(1970); Aumiller v. University of Del., 434 F. Supp. 1273 (D. Del. 1977), is a recent case
expressly rejecting the application of intentional infliction standards in a damage action
under§ 1983 for violation of first amendment rights.
20
See Colley, Civil Actions for Damages Arising Out of Violations of Cil'il Rights, 17
HASTINGS L.J. 189, 200-01 (1965); Note, Minority Workers and the Continuing Effects of
Racial Discrimination - The Limits of Remedial Treatment, 58 IOWA L. REV. 143 (1972).
21
In many housing discrimination situations, see cases cited in note 5 supra, where the
prospective tenant is merely informed that no apartments are availabale, the offensiveness
of the lessor's "facially neutral" act is realized only after the cooperation of a civil rights
organization investigator reveals that the availability of the apartment was misrepresented.
Similarly, there is nothing per se rude or outrageous in the receipt of a "pink slip" or a denial
of admission to a private school.
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tion. 22 Virtually all courts now agree that such feelings of humiliation and
injustice are compensable injuries under various anti-discrimination statutes, regardless of whether the defendant's illegal discriminatory conduct was otherwise "outrageous" .23

B. Present Standards
Although most courts have nominally discarded the intentional infliction of mental distress analysis in discrimination cases, suspicion concerning the genuineness and seriousness of alleged mental distress still
influences the evidentiary standards for mental distress awards in discrimination cases. This suspicion remains despite judicial language recognizing that mental suffering, embarrassment, and humiliation are "direct," "proximate," or "natural" consequences 24 of discriminatory conduct. Because victims of discrimination carry the burden of proving the
genuineness and seriousness of their mental distress without the benefit of
evidentiary presumptions, damage claims under Title VIIl 25 and the
nineteenth century civil rights acts 26 bear resemblance to most tort bodily
injury actions. 27 Indeed, to the extent that courts in discrimination cases
have required certain "guarantees of genuineness, " 28 such as medical
evidence of physical manifestations of distress, these cases resemble
actions under the emerging theories of reckless or negligent infliction of
mental distress 29 which have evolved simultaneously with the rejection of

22
Richards, Compensatory and Punitive Damages in Employment Discrimination Cases,
27 ARK. L. REV. 603, 606-7 (1973).
23 Steele v. Title Realty Co., 478 F.2d 380, 384 (10th Cir. 1973); Hughes v. Dyer, 378 F.
Supp. 1305, 1310 (W.D. Mo. 1974) (mental distress damages available even though discrimination "was perpetrated in a courteous manner and was not vindictive.").
24
McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082, 1089 (4th Cir. 1975); Williams v. Joyce, 4 Ore.
App. 482, 479 P.2d 513, 523 (1971); Browning v. Slenderella Systems of Seattle, 54 Wash. 2d
440, 451, 341 P.2d 859, 866 (1959), see note 15 supra.
25
Civil Rights Act of 1968, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (1977).
26 The relevant provisions of the 1866 and 1871 Civil Rights Acts are now codified as 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981-88, cf. notes 5 & 6 supra.
27
See PROSSER, supra note I, at 208-09, 330-31.
28
Id., at 327-35.
29
The "reckless or negligent infliction of mental distress" is gaining recognition in two
types of cases. First, where a plaintiff, though not injured physically, was the primary victim
of a defendant's negligence, courts have uniformly required proof of anxiety-related physical symptoms as a "circumstantial guarantee" of the mental distress claimed. See, e.g.,
Hunsley v. Giard, 87 Wash. 2d 424, 553 P.2d 1096 ( 1976). The few ancient exceptions to this
rule, including cases of the negligent transmission of a death message and the negligent
handling of a corpse, in which the genuineness of mental distress has been presumed from
the nature of the negligent act, have not lost their vitality. although they are generally
recognized in only a minority of jurisdictions. See Johnson v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 334
N.E. 2d 590 (1975). In the second type of case in which the "negligent infliction" cause of
action has been recognized, the plaintiffs mental distress is caused by witnessing an injury
negligently or intentionally inflicted upon another person. Most courts have found such
injuries unforeseeable and have refused any compensation. The few courts which have
provided compensation have imposed the circumstantial guarantee requirements suggested
by Prosser's review of the cases. See PROSSER, supra note I, at 334-35. To warrant
compensation. a plaintiff must prove not only an emotional response so severe as to
generate actual physical injury. but also a close, usually immediate, family relationship with
the primary victim and facts that tend to demonstrate the plaintiffs contemporaneous
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the tort "impact rule" 30 in many jurisdictions.
I. Proving Mental Distress-Medical evidence although seldom designated a prerequisite to recovery, 31 has played an important role in almost
all large mental distress damage awards in discrimination cases. 32 The
number of cases in which plaintiffs have presented medical evidence of
mental distress, however, is extremely small. 33 Mental distress, although
severe, is not always manifested in physical symptoms. 34 Even if symptoms are apparent, victims may not seek help for a number of practical
reasons, including prohibitive cost, embarrassment, and feelings that the
discrimination injury is medically illegitimate, not serious, or untreatable.35
In the absence of medical evidence, a victim must rely on circumstantial evidence to support his claim of mental distress. A victim's personal
sensory observation ofthe'primary victim's injury. Krouse v. Graham, 57 Cal. App. 3d 752,
129 Cal. Rptr. 624 (1976), rev'd on other grounds, 19 Cal. 3d 59, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863, 562 P.2d
1022 (1977); Gustafson v. Faris, 67 Mich. App. 363, 241 N.W.2d 208 (1976).
30 The "impact rule", discredited in many jurisdictions, see,e.g., Battalla v. State, IO
N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34, (1961); Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401,
261 A.2d 84 (1970), essentially mandated that a plaintiff could collect damages for mental or
emotional disturbance predicated upon a defendant's negligence only if accompanied by a
bodily impact to the plaintiff. See, e.g., 2.elinsky v. Chimics, 196 Pa. Super. 312, 175 A.2d
351 (1961).
31
Seaton v. Sky Realty, Inc., 491 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1974) (no medical prerequisite);
Broadway Realty, Inc. v. N.Y. State Division of Human Rights, 49 App. Div. 2d 422, 376
N. Y.S.2d 17 (1975) (requirement of corroboration, either by medical proof or by circumstantial guarantees of genuineness).
32
In Rogers v. Exxon Research and Eng'r Co., 404 F. Supp. 324 (D.N.J. 1975), extensive
medical testimony cataloguing a series of serious anxiety-related afflictions was presented,
and the plaintiff was awarded $750,000 for mental distress, the first six-figure mental distress
damage award ever returned in a discrimination case. The trial judge remitted the jury
verdict to $200,000, and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently vacated the award
on statutory grounds, 550 F.2d 834 (3rd Cir. 1977). In other cases, evidence of hospitalization, loss of appetite, and headaches has helped victims of discrimination win more moderate awards for mental distress under anti-discrimination statutes. Allen v. Gifford, 368 F.
Supp. 317 (E.D. Va. 1973) ($3500); Zahorian v. Russell Fit Real Estate Agency, 62 N.J. 399,
301 A.2d 754 (1973) ($750).
Two recent cases, whose accounts are unclear concerning the presence of medical
evidence at trial, pose a potential and welcomed challenge to this proposition. See Coates v.
National Cash Register Co., 433 F. Supp. 655 (W.D. Va. 1977) ($15,000 awarded to each of
two plaintiffs under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Harrison v. Otto G.
Heinzeroth Mortgage Co., 430 F. Supp. 893 (N.D. Ohio 1977) ($5000 awarded to single
housing discrimination plaintiff).
33
Cf. notes 31-32 supra.
34
In Combes v. Griffin Television, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 841 (W.D. Okla. 1976), a television
anchorman discharged from his job on the basis of his age testified that he had suffered such
symptoms as insomnia, depression, indigestion, and loss of weight as a result of his
termination. Id. at 847. The Court, commenting that there was "no evidence of any physical
injury or need for a physician's care", id. at 847, awarded the plaintiff only $500 in mental
distress damages, indicating that even the term "physical symptoms" can be narrowly
construed by courts in the discrimination context.
35 In Walker v. Fox, 395 F. Supp. 1303 (S.D. Ohio 1975), a tenant who witnessed her
landlord's racially motivated refusal to rent an apartment to a prospective tenant testified
that she "wrote letters to her family and talked to school and civil rights officials to work out
the conflict and distress she felt." Id. at 1306. It is likely that many victims of discrimination
tum to similar sources for consolation rather than to more expensive and more stigmatizing
"medical" sources.
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testimony, describing his unfair treatment and his resultant feelings and
exhibiting his general demeanor, is often the only evidence he can provide.36 Courts additionally have considered the plaintiffs expectation of
receiving equal treatment, evaluating this expectation in light of the
nature of the service defendant provides and its advertised availability to
the public. 37 The extent to which the defendant directly exposed a plaintiff to public embarrassment in denying services or entitlements 38 and the
inconvenience experienced t;,y the plaintiff in searching for alternative
services 39 may provide further evidence of mental distress.
In some jurisdictions, a victim of discrimination may be required to
show that his mental distress was not attributable to unusual personal
sensitivity. The plaintiffs evidentiary burden in this regard has been
defined inconsistently in some jurisdictions. For example, in 1974, the
New York Court of Appeals held that circumstantial testimony must
persuade the fact-finder that a "reasonable person of average sensibilities" could fairly be expected to suffer mental anguish from the
defendant's actions. 40 One year later, a lower state court, ostensibly
applying the Court of Appeals standard, held that a plaintiffs mental
anguish need only be "understandable under the circumstances" to be
compensable.4' In a number of jurisdictions, fact-finders have considered
the sensitivity of the victim, citing past experiences with discrimination or
other predisposing circumstances, in augmenting the plaintiffs mental
distress damage award. 42 In one New Jersey case, however, a plaintiff's
36
Lichtman, supra note 7, at 67, attributes much of the failure of mental distress claims in
housing discrimination cases to the necessity of fact-finders "to rely heavily on personal
experience as a guide to assessing damages." Often such testimony is quite dramatic, see,
e.g., Smith v. Anchor Building Corp., 536 F.2d 231 (8th Cir. 1976); Lamb v. Sallee, 417 F.
Supp. 282 (E.D. Ky. 1976), but has been largely ineffective in generating large mental
distress awards. See notes 48-50 infra.
37
Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Assoc., Inc., 367 F. Supp. 860 (D. Md. 1973).
38 Seaton v. Sky Realty, Inc., 491 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1974) (plaintiff humiliated in the
presence of his children); Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'r, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88, 468
P.2d 216 ( 1970) (employee humiliated in presence of other employees).
39
Seaton v. Sky Realty, Inc., 491 F.2d 634, 636 (7th Cir. 1974) ("several trips to and from
the home site and the offices of the defendant"); Stevens v. Dobs, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 618,
623 (E.D.N .C. 1974) ("considerable extra time in locating an apartment").
40 Batavia Lodge No. 196, Loyal Order of Moose v. New York State Div. of Human
Rights, 43 App. Div. 2d 807, 350 N.Y.S.2d 273 (1973), mental distress damages authorized
on appeal. 35 N.Y.2d 143, 359 N.Y.S.2d 25, 316 N.E.2d 318 (1974). The quotation is from
the dissenting opinion of Marsh, J. in the lower court decision. 43 App. Div. 2d 807, 350
N. Y .S. 2d 273, 278 (1973) whose standard was adopted by the majority on appeal, 316 N .E.
2d 318, 318-19.
41
121-129 Broadway Realty. Inc. v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 49 App.Div.
2d 422, 424. 376 N.Y.S. 2d 17. 19 (1975). See also Steele v. Title Realty Co., 478 F.2d 380,
384 (10th Cir. 1973).
42
Steele v. Title Realty Co .. 478 F.2d 380. 384 (10th Cir. 1973) (plaintiff "not a stranger"
to acts of discrimination. having been denied housing facilities on the basis of race "in
college towns across the country ... on a number of occasions"); see also Harrison v. Otto
G. Heinzeroth Mortgage Co .. 430 F. Supp. 893. 897 (N.D. Ohio 1977) (plaintiff "had lived in
racially mixed neighborhoods with no problems"); Zamantakis v. Commonwealth Human
Rights Comm'n, 10 Pa. Commw. Ct. 107. 111, 308 A.2d 612. 613 (1973) (plaintiff had
recently returned from Vietnam and was "quite upset to find the freedom for which he had
fought was being denied him here in ihe United States"; damage verdict vacated, however,
on statutory grounds).
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impressive academic record and "exceptional character" were cited in
mitigation of his mental distress damage award, because such qualities
were assumed to better equip a person to weather feelings of disappointment. 43 The latter holding is unusual, but it does point out a potential
dilemma for the plaintiff's attorney. If the attorney presents evidence of a
client's sensitivity to discriminatory treatment, the fact-finder may conclude that the victim's mental distress was not that of a "reasonable
person of average sensibilities." On the other hand, if the attorney puts
forth evidence of the client's dignified status and refinement in an effort to
emphasize the insulting nature of the client's inferior treatment, the
fact-finder may decide that the client was able to endure discriminatory
treatment without substantial injury.
A victim of discrimination may also fail to recover mental distress
damages unless he can prove that his distress was proximately caused by
the defendant's discrimination. For example, medical testimony concerning physical manifestations of psychological stress has been frequently
challenged on the basis that certain symptoms cannot be directly traced to
a defendant's actions or to emotional upset at all. Such challenges have
achieved significant success in mitigating damage awards. 44
There is a division of authority as to whether mental distress suffered
by a plaintiff during the trial of a discrimination case is a compensable
injury. Some courts have found such injury an inevitable and compensable consequence of a discriminator's wrongdoing, 45 while another court
has held that such irtjuries are merely the normal results of litigation and
noncompensable. 46
2. Mental Distress Awards-Mental distress awards in discrimination
cases appear to be less on the average than in analogous tort cases.47

43
In Grayv. Serruto Builder, Inc., l!ON.J. Super. 297, 265 A.2d404, 416(1970), the New
Jersey Supreme Court disregarded medical evidence of mental distress to limit the plaintiffs
damages to $500, citing plaintiff's "exceptional character," impressive academic achievements, and significant athletic prowess in support of its assertion that plaintiff "is a man not
likely to be bowled over by a single set-back," a "strong man, not ... [a] weakling."
44
Marr v. Rife, 503 F.2d 735 (6th Cir. 1974); Zahorian v. Russell Fit Real Estate Agency,
62 N.J. 399, 301 A.2d 754 (1973); Gray v. Serruto Builders, Inc., 110 N.J. Super. 297, 265
A.2d 404 (1970).
45
Stevens v. Dobs, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 618, 623 (E.D.N.C. 1974) (mental distress compensation for humiliation of defendant exploration of plaintiff hygienic matters during trial). See
also Harrison v. Otto G. Heinzeroth Mortgage Co., 430 F. Supp. 893, 897 (N.D. Ohio 1977)
(citing "the mental and nervous strain that litigants always undergo" in support of its mental
distress award).
46
School Dist. No. I, Multnomah Co., Ore. v. Nilsen, 271 Ore. 461, 485-86, 534 P.2d
1135, 1146 (1975).
47
There is no conclusive data concerning the average size of mental distress awards in
either discrimination or other dignitary tort cases. Many of the decided cases are not
reported, and many other cases are settled prior to litigation through negotiations which
consider potential mental distress. Even in reported cases, the portion of a compensatory
damage award attributable solely to mental distress is often not stated. Compare, however,
the discrimination cases cited in note 52 infra with Clark v. I.H. Rubenstein, Inc., 335 So. 2d
545 (La. App. 1976) ($500 for wrongful detention ofless than five minutes, due to shoplifting
accusation); Hayes v. Dompe, 331 So. 2d 874 (La. App. 1976) ($500 damages for embarrassment and distress following wrongful seizure of furniture); Columbus Finance, Inc., v.
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Individual plaintiffs have received compensation of$1000 or less in nearly
three-quarters of the more than thirty-fi~e reported discrimination cases
awarding mental distress damages. 48 All of the awards of less than $1000
Howard, 38 Ohio App. 2d 7, 311 N.E.2d 32 (1973) ($760 for mental distress and public
humiliation due to wrongful attachment of automobile); Moore v. Greene, 431 F.2d 584 (9th
Cir. 1970) ($1000 damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress); Booty v. Am.
Finance Corp. of Shreveport, 224 So. 2d 512 (La. App. 1969) ($1000 for creditor coercion);
Cohen v. Varig Airlines, S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 85 Misc. 2d 653,
380 N.Y.S. 2d 450 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.C. 1975), modified, 88 Misc. 2d 998, 390 N.Y.S.2d 515
(1976) ($1750 award for airline's tortious conversion of passenger's baggage including mental
distress damage; award reduced by $250 on appeal); Blinick v. Long Island Daily Press
Publishing Co., 67 Misc. 2d 254, 323 N.Y.S.2d 853 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.C. 1971), appeal dismissed, 71 Misc. 2d 986, 337 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1972) ($4250 to each of two defendants for
erroneous embarrassing publication); Broughton v. State, 37 N .Y. 2d 451, 373 N .Y.S. 2d 87,
373 N.E. 2d 310 (1975), cert. denied sub nom., Schanberger v. Kellogg, 423 U.S. 929 (1975)
($5000 for mental anguish, humiliation, and false imprisonment); Dotson v. McLaughlin, 216
Kan. 201, 531 P.2d I (1975) ($8000 award for invasion of privacy, vacated on substantive
grounds on appeal); Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. 1973' ($10,000 for invasion
of privacy); Jones v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 459 F.2d 584 (6th Cir. 1972) ($10,000 "actual
damages" for slander; separate additional awards for medical expenses and loss of consortium); Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 431 F. Supp. 254 (E.D. Pa. 1977) ($10,000
damages for intentional infliction of mental distress); Holcombe v. Whitaker, 294 Ala. 430,
318 So. 2d 289 (1975) ($20,000 for fraud in inducement to marry, and assault); Green v.
Meadows, 527 S.W. 2d 496 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1975) ($20,000 for injury to "feelings, name
and reputation" resulting from malicious embezzlement prosecution); Womack v. Eldridge,
215 Va. 338, 210 S.E. 2d 145 (1974) ($45,000 jury verdict against private investigator who
fraudulently gained permission to photograph plaintiff and used the pictures in an embarrassing manner); see also Firestone v. Time, Inc., 305 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1974), vacated and
remanded, 424 U.S. 448 (1976) ($100,000 libel verdict includes compensation for mental
anguish and humiliation).
48
Marr v. Rife, 503 F.2d 735 (6th Cir.), affd, 545 F.2d 735 (6th Cir. 1976) ($1); State
Human Rights Comm'ns v. Pauley, 212 S.E. 2d 77 (1975) ($100); Williams v. Joyce, 4 Ore.
App. 482, 479 P.2d 513 (1971) ($200); Zamantakis v. Commonweath Human Rights Comm'n,
10 Pa. Commw. Ct. 107, 308 A.2d 612 (1973) ($250); Batavia Lodge No. 196, Loyal Order of
Moose v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 35 N.Y. 2d 143, 359 N.Y.S. 2d 25, 316
N .E. 2d 318 (1974) ($250); Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination v. Franzaroli, 357
Mass. 112, 256 N.E. 2d 311 (1970) ($250); Hodge v. Seiler, 558 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1977)
($500); Combes v. Griffin Television, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 841 (W.D. Okla. 1976) ($500);
Walker v. Fox, 395 F. Supp. 1303 (S.D. Ohio 1975) ($500); Seaton v. Sky Realty, Inc., 491
F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1974) ($500); Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 393
(D.D.C. 1972) ($500); Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Lysyj, 38 Ohio St. 2d 217, 313 N.E.2d 3,
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1108 (1975) ($500); State Division of Human Rights v. Great Atlantic
& Pacific Tea Co., Inc., 46 App. Div. 2d 1001, 362 N.Y.S. 2d 105 (1974) ($500); Gray v.
Serruto Builders, Inc., 110 N.J. Super. 297, 265 A.2d 404 (1970) ($500); Broadway Realty,
Inc. v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 49 App. Div. 2d 422, 376 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1975)
($500); State Comm'n for Human Rights v. Speer, 35 App. Div. 2d 107, 313 N.Y.S.2d 28
(1970), rev'd and remanded for determination of damages, 29 N. Y.2d 555, 324 N. Y.S.2d 297,
272 N.E.2d 884 (1971) ($500); School Dist. No. I, Multnomah County, Ore. v. Nilsen, 17
Ore. App. 601, 523 P.2d 1041 (1974), rev'don other grounds, 271 Ore. 461, 534 P.2d 1135
(1975) ($700); Lamb v. Salles, 417 F. Supp. 282 (E.D. Ky. 1976) ($750); Hughes v. Dyer, 378
F. Supp. 1305 (W.D. Mo. 1974) ($750); Zahorian v. Russell Fitt Real Estate Agency, 62 N.J.
399, 301 A.2d 754 (1973) ($750); Bishop v. Pecsok, 431 F. Supp. 34 (N .D. Ohio, 1976), ($1500
awarded to husband and wife - may include damages for non-psychological injury as well);
Steele v. Title Realty Co., 478 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1973) ($861.75); Mendota Apartments v.
D.C. Comm'n of Human Rights, 315 A.2d 832 (D.C. 1974) ($1000); Span v. Pa. Human
Rights Comm'n, 15 Pa. Commw. Ct. °334, 325 A.2d 678 (1974) ($1000); McNeil v. P-N & S,
Inc., 372 F. Supp. 658 (N.D. Ga. 1973) ($2500 to two plaintiffs); Clemons v. Runck, 402 F.
Supp. 863 (S.D. Ohio 1975) ($1500 - includes damages for non-psychologii;al injury as well);
Stevens v. Dobs, Inc.,-373 F. Supp. 618 (E.D.N.C. 1974) ($1500); McCrary v. Runyon, 515
F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1975), affd, 427 U.S. 160, 166 n.4 (1976) ($2000); Boumewood Hosp. v.
Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 358 N .E. 2d 235 (1976) ($2000); Loyal
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were determined by judges or administrative bodies, not by juries. 49
Judges have not hesitated to exercise their power of remittitur to reduce
jury verdicts they find "excessive" in light of the evidence presented. 50
Although the number of cases on which the observation is based is small,
judges and administrative decision-makers appear to be less likely then
juries to award substantial mental distress damages in discrimination
cases. 51
Significant barriers to the recovery of substantial mental distress damages are inherent in litigation of discrimination claims. Many states, for
example, require that discrimination claims be heard by an administrative
board either exclusively or as a prerequisite to the initiation of a civil
action for damages. 52 Such boards, however, often lack jurisdiction to
hear claims for monetary damages. 53 Therefore, in order to pursue a claim
for damages in these states, victims of discrimination must either initiate
actions in multiple forums or delay their damage actions until they acquire
a favorable administrative determination of the defendant's liability. The
potential costs of subsequently bringing a claim for mental distress in a
state court may often significantly outweigh the likely benefits, even
though some state discrimination statutes permit attorney's fee awards to
be awarded to successful plaintiffs. 54 In addition, some jurisdictions place

Order of Moose No. 145 v. Pa. Human Rights Comm'n, 16 Pa. Commw. Ct. 433, 328 A.2d
180 (1974) ($2500); Allen v. Gifford, 368 F. Supp. 317 (E.D. Va. 1973) ($3500 - includes
damages for non-psychological injury as well); Harrison v. Otto G. Heinzeroth Mortgage
Co., 430 F. Supp. 893 (N.D. Ohio 1977) ($5000 "compensatory" damages); Buckholtz v.
Symons Mfg. Co., 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1084 (E.D. Wisc. 1978) ($7500); Parker v.
Shonfeld, 409 F. Supp. 876 (N.D. Cal. 1976) ($10,000); Coates v. National Cash Register
Co., 433 F. Supp. 655 (W.D. Va 1977) ($15,000); Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r, 404 F.
Supp. 324 (D.N .J. 1975) ($750,000 remitte to $200,000), mental distress award vacated, 550
F. 2d 834 (3rd Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S.Ct. 749 (1978). The figures cited represent the
damages awarded by the trial court, adjusted by remittitur or appellate modification on
evidentiary grounds, but without regard to appellate reversal on statutory grounds. Cases in
which claimants received mental distress awards after appellate review are listed in note 5
supra.
49
See cases cited in note 48 supra.
50
See, e.g., Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., 404 F. Supp. 324 (D.N.J. 1975)
($750,000 verdict remitted to $200,000); Broadway Realty v. New York State Div. of Human
Rights, 49 App. Div. 2d 422, 376 N. Y.S.2d 17 ( 1975) ($500 award reduced to $100 on appeal).
51
See Lichtman, supra note 7, at 966 n.16. Of the eleven cases cited in note 48 supra. in
which more than $1000 was awarded, four cases involved jury damage verdicts, three of
which are the three highest damage awards listed. See Clemons v. Runck, 402 F. Supp. 863
(S.D. Ohio 1975); Parker v. Shonfeld, 409 F. Supp. 876 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Coates v. National
Cash Register Co., 433 F. Supp. 655 (W.D. Va. 1977); Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r,
404 F. Supp. 324 (D.N .J. 1975), mental distress award vacated, 550 F.2d 834 (3rd Cir. 1977).
52 See, e.g., MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 64-301 (Cum. Supp. I 1977) (exclusive administrative remedy for non-public employees).
53 See Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Lysyj, 38 Ohio St. 2d 217, 313 N.E.2d 3 (1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1108 (1975); Mendota Apartments v. D.C. Comm'n on Human Rights, 315
A.2d 832 (D.C. 1974); Zamantakis v. Commonwealth Human Rights Comm'n, 10 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 107, 308 A.2d 612 (1973); Iron Workers Local No. 67 v. Hart, 191 N.W.2d 758
(Iowa 1971); State Comm'n for Human Rights v. Speer, 35 App. Div. 2d 107. 313 N.Y.S. 2d
28 (1970).
54
See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 1518, § 5 (1975); N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 4-33-11
(1975) ($1000 limit).
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statutory limits on the amount of compensatory damage awards in discrimination cases. 55
C. Focus of Reform

Present standards for the award of mental distress damages in discrimination cases are far less restrictive that former "intentional infliction of
mental distress" standards. Victims of discrimination no longer need to
prove the "outrageousness" of the defendant's conduct nor the "severe"
nature of their mental distress as conditions precedent to recovery. Present standards purport to place no greater burden on plaintiffs than in
most tort contexts; however, they have generated very few large damage
verdicts for plaintiffs.
Some barriers to substantial recovery are derived directly from the
requirements of certain discrimination statutes and may only be removed
by legislative reform. Other barriers appear related to the evidentiary
standards that victims of discrimination must meet and can be eliminated
by the judiciary. These latter barriers arise from the difficulty of proving
the adverse psychological effects of discrimination and judicial skepticism
about the propriety of compensating the discrimination injury. These
impediments, as the remainder of this article will urge, are ones that
courts and administrative boards can and should remove without further
delay.

II.

PROPOSED STANDARDS FOR THE AWARD OF MENTAL DISTRESS
DAMAGES IN DISCRIMINATION CASES

A. Tort Analogies

The language commonly cited to advocate application of tort damage
standards to discrimination cases is that of Justice Marshall in Curtis v.
Loether: 56
An action to redress racial discrimination may also be likened
to an action for defamation or intentional infliction of mental
distress. Indeed, the contours of the latter tort are still developing, and it has been suggested that 'under the logic of the common law of insult and indignity, racial discrimination might be
treated as a dignitary tort'. 57

55
CAL. C1v. CODE§§ 52, 55 (West Supp. 1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-127g
31-128. 53-35. 53-36 (West Supp. 1978); HAW. REV. STAT. § 515-13(b)(7) (1976); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN.§§ 37.2605(2)(i)-(i). 37.2802 (Supp. 1977-78); Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 213.127
(Vernon Supp. 1977-78); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.§ 64-304 (Supp. 1977-78); NEB. REV.
STAT.§ 20-118(6) (1977); NEV. REV. STAT.§§ 118.120, 651.090 (1977); OR. REV. STAT.§
30.680 (1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 34-37-5(L)(b) (1970); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9. § 2461 (Supp.
1977). tit. 21. § 495b (Supp. 1977).
56
415 U.S. 189 (1974). See note 4 supra.
57
415 U.S. at 196 n. 10.
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Justice Marshall's comments are provocative because they suggest the
desirability of compensating consequences of discrimination as tortious
injuries. The mention of defamation and the intentional infliction of mental distress as equally valid tort analogies, however, muddles the formulation of proper evidentiary standards for the award of mental distress
damages in discrimination cases. As previously shown, 58 the evidentiary
requirements for proving intentional infliction of mental distress are very
strict and courts seldom apply them in discrimination cases. The common
law of defamation, on the other hand, represents the branch of dignitary
tort law providing the most liberal compensation for the psychological
consequences of dignitary injury because it employs a presumption of
general damages and often requires a showing of only minimal actual
irtjury. 59 Nevertheless, this latter branch of tort law has been ignored by
courts and commentators who support application of "tort" damage
standards to discrimination cases. 60
Defamation awards are intended to compensate injuries to the plaintiff's reputation and, some commentators have argued, the consequential
loss in emotional tranquility. 61 The difficulties of ascertaining the extent
of intangible injury are avoided by presuming the existence of such irtjury
in certain categories of defamatory publication. 62 For example, oral
statements that impute to the plaintiff a serious crime, a loathsome disease, a lack of chastity, or qualities incompatible with his trade or business,63 as well as printed statements deemed "defamatory on their face"
are held so likely to cause damage to reputation that such cases, absent
First Amendment considerations, can be submitted to juries without any
proof of actual loss. 64 Even if the defamation does not fit into one of the

See notes 12-16 and accompanying text supra.
This is especially true of the common law of defamation prior to recent constitutional
modification. See note 64 infra.
60
See articles cited in notes 6 & 7 supra.
61
Cf. DOBBS, supra note 2, at 510.
62
Id. at 512.
63
Dispelling the notion that such categorizations are losing their vitality are cases such as
Prince v. Peterson, 538 P.2d 1325 (1975), in which the Utah Supreme Court significantly
expanded the "business" category of slander per se. Id. at 1328.
64
See DOBBS, supra note 2, at 512; Sauerhoff v. Hearst Corp., 538 F.2d 588 (4th Cir.
1976).
The presumption of damages in defamation cases was directly confronted by the Supreme
Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), a case involving press defamation
of non-public figures. Rather that apply the "knowledge of reckless disregard" standard of
N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 255 (1964), the court adopted an intermediate negligence
stndard of liability somewhat less protective of defendants' First Amendment interests.
Fearing that the intermediate standard alone would not adequately protect First Amendment
rights' from the "chill" created by the threat of large jury verdicts, the majority in Gertz
found it necessary "to restrict defamation plaintiffs who do not prove knowledge offalsity or
reckless disregard for the truth to compensation for actual injury." 418 U.S. at 349 (emphasis added). The majority defined "actual injury" in expansive language, declaring that
such injury "is not limited to out-of-pocket loss" and includes "the more customary types of
actual harm" such as "impairment of reputation, and standing in the community, personal
humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering." 418 U.S. at 349-50 (emphasis added).
The Gertz requirement the mental distress be proven rather than presumed is not appropriately applied to most discrimination cases. Few discrimination defendants can assert
constitutional interests of the integrity of freedom of expression in their defense. Moreover,
58

59
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categories of per se liability, most courts hold that upon a showing of
consequential pecuniary loss or "special damages," the cause of action
for general damages can be submitted to the fact-finder as if defamation
per se had been proven. 65
The fact-finder in defamation cases is free to make its own reasonable
estimate of a plaintiffs probable loss of reputation in the community,
lessened esteem among peers, and most significantly in the view of some
courts, damage to emotional tranquility. 66 Defendants bear the burden of
coming forward with evidence rebutting or mitigating the reputational and
mental distress elements of a plaintiffs damage action. 67 Furthermore,
courts sometimes increase the defendant's burden by barring, as unduly
prejudicial, evidence showing, for example, that the plaintiff possessed
such a callous disposition that any mental distress suffered due to the
defendant's actions could not have been of substantial severity. 68
The concept of "presumed" damages is not confined to the t9rt of
defamation. In civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 69 the courts
have developed an element of damages that may best be characterized as
compensation for "the loss of civil rights per se. " 70 This award is dethe Gertz language suggests that those victims who satisfy the more demanding N. Y. Times
standard of defendant liability, by showing that the defamation was perpetrated "knowingly" or "in reckless disregard" of the consequences, may still receive the benefit of
presumed damages. Similarly, many illegal acts of discrimination are "knowingly" perpetrated, if not perpetrated in "reckless disregard" of anti-discrimination laws.
65
See Prosser, supra note I, at 761, citing Day, Mental Suffering as an Element of
Damages in Defamation Cases. 15 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 26 (1966), in which the artificiality
of the "special damage" requirement is examined and criticized.
66
See DOBBS, supra note 2, at 514, and the discussion of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323 ( 1974) in note 64 supra. See also Sauerhoff v. Hearst Corp., 538 F.2d 588 (4th Cir.
1976) (Maryland Jaw); Jones v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 459 F.2d 584 (6th Cir. 1972)
(Michigan law); Fuqua Television, Inc. v. Fleming, 134 Ga. App. 731, 215 S. E.2d 694 (1975).
The Supreme Court in Carey v. Piphus, 46 U.S.L.W. 4224, 4228 (1978), discussed in notes
72-77 infra, noted that
The doctrine [of presumed damages in the common Jaw of defamation per se J has
been defended on the grounds that those forms of defamation that are actionable
per se are virtually certain to cause serious injury to reputation, and that this kind
of injury is extremely difficult to prove. See Gertz v. Welch, supra, at 373, 376
(WHITE, J ., dissenting). [footnote omitted] Moreover, statements that are defamatory per se by their very nature are likely to cause mental and emotional
distress, as well as injury to reputation, so there arguably is little reason to require
proof of this kind of injury either.
67
See DOBBS, supra note 2, at 515-16.
68
/d. at 516-17. See Gray v. Serruto Builders, Inc., 110 N.J. Super. 297, 265 A.2d 404, 416
(1970), discussed in note 43 supra.
69
Enacted by the Congress of 1871. 42 U .S.C. § 1983 (1974) provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any ... regulation, custom, or usage of any
State ... subjects. or causes to be subjected, any ... person ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges. or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit on equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress. 70 Niles, Civil Actions for Damages Under the Federal Civil Rights Statutes, 45 TEX. L.
REv. 1015, 1034 (1967) speaks of§ 1983 damages as an award for "deprivation of civil
rights," which is neither wholly punitive nor compensatory. Note, Measuring Damages for
Violations of Individuals' Constitutional Rights, 8 VAL. L. REV. 357 (1974), discusses two
types of§ 1983 damages, one of which is characterized as damages for violation of "constitutional rights alone." The second type is an action for consequential damages, including
damages for mental distress, which result directly from a defendant's action which may be
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signed to compensate persons for intangible injuries caused by the loss of
legal rights alone, independent of physical injury or monetary damage
caused by a defendant State agent's actions.7 1 Although some courts have
viewed this award as compensation for "a taking" of legal rights, 72 the
injury redressed is a purely psychological one, representing the shock,
disgust, and disappointment experienced when a government agent violates rights that the law guarantees. 73 Though the Supreme Court in Carey
v. Piphus 74 has hL;j that only nominal damages may be presumed in a
section 1983 action for deprivation of procedural due process rights, 75 the
independently tortious, such as placement in solitary confinement, Taylor v. Clement, 433
F. Supp. 585 (S.D.N .Y. 1977), use of unnecessary force in arrest, McArthur v. Pennington,
253 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Tenn. 1963), or refusal to provide emergency care to one to whom
the defendant owes a duty, Shannon v. Lester, 519 F.2d 76 (6th Cir. 1975). This element of
damages is not presumed by the courts and must be proven by plaintiffs, similar to
negligence cases and statutory discrimination actions. See Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167,
209-10 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Leventhal, J., concurring). But see Guzman v. Western State Bank
of Devils Lake, 540 F.2d 948 (8th Cir. 1976). It is noteworthy, however, that courts have not
imposed "physical injury'• requirements as in other tort contexts. See notes 29 and 30
supra.
71
Rivera Morales v. Benitez de Rexach, 541 F.2d 882 (1st Cir. 1976) (patronage firing in
violation of associational rights; $10,000 for "pain and suffering"); Endress v. Brookdale
Community College, 144 N.J. Super. 109, 141-43, 364 A.2d 1080, 1097-98 (1976) (discharge
without due process; $10,000 award reduced to $2500); Bruce v. Board of Regents for
Northwest Mo. State Univ., 414 F. Supp. 559 (W.D. Mo. 1976) (discharge without due
process; damage hearing ordered); Hostrop v. Board of Junior College Dist. No. 515. 523 F.2d
569 (7th Cir. 1975). cert. denied, 425 U.S. 963 (1976) (discharge without due process;
remanded for damage determination); Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899 (6th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 930 (1975) (picketer's freedom of speech violated; remanded
for damage determination); Manfredonia v. Barry, 401 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1975)
(unlawful arrest; $3500). See also Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (jury can
award damages to demonstrators arrested in violation of first and fourth amendment rights
on class-wide basis, but only for losses of rights "actually sustained" and not based on
"platitudes about priceless rights"; jury award of $7500 per plaintiff found excessive).
72
In Carey v. Piphus, 46 U.S.L.W. 4224, 4226 (1968), discussed in notes 74-76 infra, the
Supreme Court rejected respondents' characterization of§ 1983 damages as compensation
for deprivations of "constitutional rights ... valuable in and of themselves." Rather, the
Court accepted petitioners' contention that "the basic purpose of a § 1983 damages award
should be to compensate persons for injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional
rights." (emphasis added). Hence, the focus in § 1983 cases is the compensation of
psychological injury actually suffered by complainants. The issue before the Court in Carey
was the circumstances under which fact-finders may presume such injury to have occurred,
relieving complainants of the burden of coming forward with evidence of actual emotional
injury.
73 See DOBBS, supra note 2, at 731.
74
46 U.S.L.W. 4224 (1978).
75
In Carey. a district court found that although public school officials had suspended two
students for justifiable reasons. they had failed to accord those students requisite procedural
due process in doing so. The district court refused to award damages under§ 1983 because
plaintiffs put forth no evidence of actual psychological injury resulting from the absence of
an appropriate opportunity to be heard. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
reversed and remanded, 545 F.2d 30 (7th Cir. 1976), holding that plaintiffs were entitled to
recover substantial compensatory damages simply because they had been denied due
process and that plaintiffs were not obligated to prove any individualized injury.
The Supreme Court reversed the seventh circuit, limiting its discussion to the award of
presumed damages in procedural due process cases. The Court cited three reasons for its
holding that in such cases, absent proof of actual psychological injury, aggrieved parties are
entitled to recover only nominal damages "not to exceed one dollar." 46 U.S.L.W. at 4229.
First, distinguishing the award of presumed damages in defamation per se cases, the Court
held that it is "not reasonable to assume that every departure from procedural due process,
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Court's decision suggests that courts may continue to presume substantial
damages for emotional harm where certain "substantive" legal rights
have been violated. 76 Where presumed damages are authorized under
section 1983, it is difficult to imagine, and no court has indicated, what
type of evidence a defendant mig'1t put forth in rebuttal or mitigation of
damages.
B. Application to Discrimination

The preceding consideration of common Jaw defamation and section
1983 "statutory tort" actions clearly shows that "tort law" is not uniform
in its approach to compensating mental distress injury, and in some
contexts provides substantial monetary damages to compensate for
psychological injury. In affording mental distress damages under discrimination statutes that do not outline evidentiary standards, courts
should draw on the full range of tort damage theories to develop evidentiary presumptions and inferences that accommodate the peculiar nature
of the discrimination injury and the difficulties of its proof. 77
Judicial power to create evidentiary presumptions derives from the
inherent authority of judges to institute sensible and time-saving evidentiary rules that allow certain inferences to be shown unless contrary
evidence is presented. 78 Traditionally, the exercise of this discretion has
no matter what the circumstances or how minor," is inherently likely to cause the aggrieved
party mental distress, especially where the deprivation of the complainant's underlying
substantive interest was justified. 46 U.S.L.W. at 4228. Second, because§ 1983 provides no
relief for injuries caused by justified deprivations of substantive interests, it is important that
the aggrieved party demonstrate that he suffered distress "because of the denial of procedural due process itself." 46 U.S.L.W. at 4228. Finally, the Court envisioned "no
particular difficulty in producing evidence" of such a causal link; as in defamation cases,
genuine injury, "although essentially subjective ... may be evidenced by one's conduct and
observed by others." 46 U.S.L.W. at 4228, n. 20.
76
The Court commented, 46 U.S.L.W. at 4228-29:
The Court of Appeals believed ... that cases dealing with awards of damages for
racial discrimination, the denial of voting rights, and the denial of Fourteenth
Amendment rights, support a presumption of damages where procedural due
process is denied .... [llhe elements and prerequisites for recovery of damages
appropriate to compensate injuries caused by the deprivation of one constitutional
right are not necessarily appropriate to compensate injuries caused by the deprivation of another. ... [T]hese issues must be considered with reference to the nature
of the interests protected by the particular constitutional right in question. For this
reason, and without intimating an opinion as to their merits, we do not deem the
cases relied upon to be controlling.
11
In Carey v. Piphus, the Supreme Court expressed an identical philosophy with regard
to the interpretation of§ 1983:
In order to further the purpose of§ 1983, the rules governing compensation for
injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights should be tailored to the
interests protected by the particular right in question-just as the common-law
rules of damages themselves were defined by the interests protected in the various
branches of tort law.
46 U.S.L.W. at 4227.
18
See McCORMICK'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 343 (2d ed. Cleary ed.
1972) [hereinafter cited as McCORMICK]. See also E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 32-33 (1963) ("to produce a result in accord with the preponderance of probability");
Greer v. United States, 245 U.S. 559, 561 (1918) (Holmes, J.) ("common experience shows
the facts to be so generally true that courts may notice the truth").
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been motivated by strong social policies favoring one class of litigants
over another. 79 The "make whole" purpose of discrimination statutes 80 is
consistent with evidentiary presumptions in favor of victims of discrimination, especially for those who have already proven illegal discrimination. Moreover, the Supreme Court has held in cases involving sections
1982, 1983, and 1988 that the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871 81 authorize courts to tum to state common law principles where these statutory provisions are inadequate to fulfill federal remedial purposes. 82
The strong likelihood that plaintiffs will have suffered substantial mental distress is a further reason for raising an evidentiary presumption of
mental distress for those who raise meritorious claims in many types of
discrimination cases. The presumption would be most appropriate for
conduct which is clearly discriminatory and cannot be supported by any
legitimate justifications, since such conduct often unequivocally communicates a message of inferiority. Presumptions may also be appropriate
in cases that involve modes of discrimination which are more subtle yet
affect benefits and opportunities crucial to the victim's well-being, such
as retention of a job.
The beneficiary of a presumption of mental distress would be entitled to
recover a minimum award of damages without introducing any evidence
of injury, although victims would of course be free to present medical or
other evidence of emotional distress. Defendants could rebut such presumptions with adequate evidence. For example, evidence that the victim
acted solely for the purpose of encouraging a defendant's well-known
discriminatory behavior with no genuine desire to seek the defendant's
services might suffice to rebut a presumption of mental distress. Courts
might also rely on other unusual circumstances, especially where a plaintiff has suffered no physical or economic loss as a result of a defendant's
discrimination, to rebut the presumption. 83
79

See McCORMICK, supra note 78.
See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Franks v. Bowman Transp.
Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976) (Title VII); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454
(1975) (1866 Civil Rights Act).
81
See notes 5, 6, 24 & 69-71 supra.
82
Indeed, there is a growing line of§ 1982 cases, see note 5 supra, which, despite the lack
of "state" involvement, have awarded what appear to be§ 1983 damages for the violation of
civil rights per se. See notes 69-71 and accompanying text supra: see also Carey v. Piphus,
46 U.S.L.W. 4224, 4228-29, n. 22 (1978); Williams v. Matthews Co., 419 F.2d 819 (8th Cir.
1974); Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., Inc., 491 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1974); Smith v. Sol D. Adler
Realty Co., 436 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1971); Hughes v. Dyer, 378 F. Supp. 1305 (W.D. Mo.
1974). In Hodge v. Seiler, 558 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1977), a§ 1982 suit between private parties
concerning the discriminatory denial of an apartment, a claimant testified that she was not
upset when she discovered the defendant's discriminatory motive and did not feel as though
she was entitled to damages for emotional distress. Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit held that
the claimant was entitled to "at least nominal damages" because she was denied "a
constitutional right" from which "damage could be presumed." 558 F.2d at 287-88. Similar
language has also appeared in housing discrimination cases under Title VIII. See Stevens v.
Dobs, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 618 (E.D.N.C. 1974); McNeil v. P-N & S, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 658
(N.D. Ga. 1973). See also WASH. REV. CoDE ANN. § 49.60.225 (Supp. 1976) (up to $1000
"for the loss of the right to be free from discrimination.").
83
See Hodge v. Seiler, 558 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1977), where a claimant's awareness of her
legal remedy prevented her from becoming upset when she learned of the defendant's
discrimination.
80
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C. Limitations of the Presumed Damage Approach

A presumption of mental distress injury, even in a limited range of
discrimination contexts, would be vulnerable to a number of criticisms.
There is no express statutory support for such a concept, and its adoption
would exacerbate the perennial concern for "run-away" jury verdicts.
Furthermore, although a statutory presumption might result in an increase in the number of awards, it would not necessarily lead to significantly greater mental distress awards, especially in courts that have
traditionally disfavored the mental distress remedy.
A presumption of mental distress injury would be virtually impossible
to rebut. A defendant would face great difficulty in disproving the existence of an intangible condition about which the victims have virtually
exclusive knowledge. Moreover, defendants would have very little access
to information concerning the quantum of mental distress compensation
due to a victim of discrimination, in contrast to the presumption of back
pay imposed upon proof of certain Title VII employment discrimination
violations. 84 These same criticisms, however, can be made of the present
mental distress compensation philosophy even though it does not provide
for a presumption of mental distress. Under the present compensation
philosophy, the difficulty of rebutting plaintiff testimony concerning intangible emotional injury has led to attacks on victim credibility and
attempted proof of the victim's hardened disposition. A presumption
would lessen the necessity for such exchanges of testimony, which place
a premium on the ability of victims to describe complex, intangible
feelings and to field questions from defendants of dubious relevance. In
addition, these exchanges usually waste time, and are often needlessly
prejudicial to the victim.
Opposition to such a virtually irrebuttable presumption may be tempered by limiting its application to cases in which it is most appropriate.
In Title VIII housing discrimination cases, for example, courts have
awarded mental distress damages not only to victims of discrimination,
but to spouses 85 and even co-tenants of the victims. 86 Although the
anguish of such third parties should be considered a compensable injury,

84
Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 491 (4th Cir., 1971) cert. dismissed, 404 U.S.
1006, 1007 (1972); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
85
In Lamb v. Sallee, 417 F. Supp. 282 (E.D. Ky. 1976), both spouses of an interracial
marriage received an award for the humiliation and emotional anguish they experienced
when their landlord evicted them after discovering that Mrs. Sallee was black. See also
Bishop v. Pecsok, 431 F. Supp. 34 (N .D. Ohio 1976) ($1500 awarded to interracial couple);
Hodge v. Seiler. 558 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1977) ($500 awarded to black husband; "at least
nominal damages" must be awarded to white wife).
6
"
In Walker v. Fox. 395 F. Supp. 1303 (S.D. Ohio 1975), a white tenant recovered $500
for mental distress in a Title VIII action. initiated after the tenant had witnessed her landlord
misrepresent the availability of an apartment to a prospective black tenant. The Walker
decision is an extension of the Supreme Court's opinion in Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 ( 1972), where the Court held that under Title VIII a tenant in the
housing unit from which a prospective tenant is discriminatorily excluded can allege the
requisite "injury in fact" to maintain standing to challenge his landlord's actions. 409 U.S.
at 210, 212.
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the less predictable nature of the irtjury and the greater likelihood that
such parties would be encouraged to raise fictitious claims strongly
suggest that a presumption in their favor would be inappropriate. A claim
for mental distress damages on behalf ofa large class, particularly in cases
of employment discrimination, may also be an inappropriate occasion for
invoking the presumption. The employer or union who maintains a discriminatory promotional system 87 or who uses hiring criteria that are
unrelated to the job and disproportionately exclude disfavored groups, 88
inflicts disappointments and frustrations upon many employees. To establish a presumption of mental distress injury on behalf of a large class,
however, is to expose defendants to enormous and virtually unavoidable
liability. Though the nature of the employment discrimination injury
seems highly deserving of mental distress compensation, only recently
has there been a realistic proposal for making such damages available
under federal anti-discrimination statutes. 89 Perhaps imposing a presumption of mental distress damages only in single-plaintiff discrimination
cases makes sense, for damage claims in those cases most closely resemble standard tort actions.

Ill. Su MMARY &

CONCLUSION

The recognition that discrimination is a tort-like injury meriting tort-like
remedies has led to the increasing availability of mental distress damages
under federal and state discrimination statutes. Yet the evidentiary standards for the award of mental distress damages are not mandated by the
terms of discrimination statutes; judges determine the requisites for proving compensable mental distress. The philosophy of compensation for
mental distress that courts have adopted in discrimination cases is in
some ways more restrictive than the compensation philosophy courts
have adopted in analogous dignitary tort contexts. As the availability of
the mental distress remedy proliferates, courts should be sensitive to the
circumstances characterizing various types of discrimination cases and
should adjust the evidentiary standards for the award of mental distress
damages accordingly, just as they have done in the various tort contexts
in which mental distress damages have traditionally been available.
This article advocates the adoption of evidentiary presumptions in
favor of certain victims of discrimination who suffer mental distress. Such
a presumption, if widely adopted, might insure that mental distress claims
of discrimination victims will be seriously considered, and that most

87
Local 189, United Papermakers and Papeiworkers v. United States, 416 F.2ci 980 (5th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970); but see International Bro. of Teamsters v.
United States (T.I.M.E.-D.C.), _
U.S. _ , 97 S. Ct. 1843 (1977).
88 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
89
See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975), supra note
5.
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defendants will be compensated for mental distress. Small verdicts in the
absence of defendant rebuttal evidence might give appellate courts a
firmer basis for evaluating and modifying such awards. Most importantly,
however, the presumption would recognize the legitimacy and seriousness of the mental distress injury, the quintessential discrimination harm.
-Harold J. Rennett

